In this paper, we argue that the bulk of EU budget spending can be attributed to measures of the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers. Using such estimates, we compare incumbent member states' predicted budget receipts before and after eastern enlargement, and examine the impact of different voting rules in EU-27. According to our estimates eastern enlargement has large effects on the budget receipts of the incumbent member states. Moreover, whether the voting rules are based on the Nice Treaty or the Constitutional Treaty makes a difference for most member states.
Most of the previous studies on the allocation of EU budget spending have focused on estimating the costs of the eastern enlargement. Courchene et al. (1993) derive estimates for the structural funds receipts of the candidate countries by using a simple extrapolation of the budget receipts of the poorest incumbent countries. Other studies, like Brenton and Gros (1993) , Anderson and Tyers (1995) , Jackson and Swinnen (1994) , and Tangermann (1996) , make specific predictions for the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) due to the eastern enlargement. All of these studies assume that the budget shares derive from the recipients' needs and contributors' solidarity.
Recent research has, however, demonstrated that a completely different approach manages to explain member states' past receipts from the EU budget. This public choice approach argues that EU budget allocations attribute to the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers, the key decision maker of EU spending. In this power politics view, member states' needs deriving from low income regions and poor agricultural conditions obtain only a minor role, if any. Baldwin et al. (1997) made, to our knowledge, the first attempt to use the political power view to explain EU budget allocations empirically. Using observations for 1993 1 and 1994, they regressed per capita receipts on a constant, per capita voting power, and a dummy variable for poor member countries. They used the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) and the actual vote shares to proxy member states' voting power. Subsequently, Baldwin et al. (2000 carried out similar regressions for the periods 1992-94 and 1995-99, separately. In the latter papers also the normalized Banzhaf index (NBI) of cooperative games were used as a measure of voting power. 2 Based on OLS regression analyses these studies concluded that per capita budget shares can be explained pretty well by measures of political power, while variables like the agriculture share of GDP and GDP per capita fail to be statistically significant.
Also Kandogan (2000) studied the correlation between actual budget shares and SSI.
He developed a tailored game theoretic model for EU's budget decision-making and applied it to assess the costs of the eastern enlargement. His empirical analysis were conducted for years 1976-85 and were concerned with both the CAP and the structural expenditures. He regressed the ratio of the budget shares in CAP expenditures to the voting power for each country against a constant, deviation of that country's adjusted percent of population in agriculture from the EU-average and the logarithm of the voting power (SSI). He argued that this regression can explain why some countries are receiving more agricultural funds than implied by their voting power alone. He run a similar regression for the structural funds and obtained the same conclusion as on the CAP shares.
In a way Kandogan's (2000) analyses indicate that the budget shares cannot be explained by power politics alone. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see from his analysis what part of the budget shares can be explained by power politics and what determines the rest of the shares. Also, a major part of the variation in the budget shares remains unexplained in these regressions. Kauppi and Widgrén (2004) In this paper, we assume that voting power is what counts in EU budget decision making and accordingly apply relevant power measures to project budgetary consequences of the eastern enlargement under two different voting schemes: the Nice and the Constitutional Treaty voting rules, the former being the current state, while the latter being a possible future state depending on an ongoing political decision process. As we do not have historical data (budget shares) for the enlarged EU, we cannot examine the importance of particular cooperative voting patterns for the power distribution of the EU-27. Therefore, our budget projections rely on a standard voting power measure that does not take any cooperative voting patterns among member countries into account. Even if this measure may miss some important cooperative patterns among the current EU member states we think it is likely to provide the most accurate budget share projections among alternative prediction approaches. To support this conclusion we revisit some (of our) earlier empirical analyses on the determinants of past EU budget shares.
Our voting power based budget share predictions yield the following findings. Independently of the voting rules examined, we find that eastern enlargement has large effects on the budget receipts of the incumbent member states. Different voting rules make significant difference for most countries' positions in the allocation. Most notably, Germany would gain remarkably from the voting rules of the Constitutional Treaty. The key explanation is that population counts more under the Constitutional Treaty -with its large population Germany would be pivotal in most voting situations in the future.
According to our estimates the Constitutional Treaty would make Germany the biggest recipient of the EU budget. Currently, France is holding this position. Whether this issue explains why Frenchmen were reluctant to accept the Constitutional Treaty is an interesting question.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical and empirical background behind our voting power measure. Section 3 gives background for the two voting rule proposals we consider, while our projections are given in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
Voting Power and Past EU Budget Allocations
The starting point of our analysis is that EU budget shares are determined by the distribution of political power among member states, and not by their needs. The following section reviews the relevant theoretical arguments, while the subsequent section shows how the theory matches with the past EU budget allocations.
Theory
We assume that the member states use their influence in the Council of Ministers to allocate as much money to their home country as possible. 4 Under this hypothesis member states' budget shares should reflect their voting power in the Council rather than their needs for CAP or structural support. In the formal analysis the budget allocation problem is treated as the dividing-up-the-cake problem. This is one of the most investigated problems in game and bargaining theory. The literature is very wide ranging from coop-erative to non-cooperative game theory with several applications. In recent years, these methods have been applied to study different aspects of EU decision-making as well. Here we adopt the cooperative approach.
A commonly used measure for actors' voting power is the Shapley-Shubik index (SSI) (Shapley and Shubik 1954) . It can be seen as a special case of a broader concept the Shapley value (Shapley 1953) in cooperative coalitional form games. SSI is restricted to socalled simple games that are usually used to model voting games. In simple voting games, winning and losing coalitions have different worth (usually one and zero respectively). The SSI is based on the broad idea that an actor that can break a winning coalition into losing, or vice versa, exerts power. These actors are critical in the sense that they may help a coalition to achieve its goals. Suppose that this help is rewarded by a price, which ends up as money in the data. Despite of their abstractness there is some recent evidence that power indices are able to capture actors' power and that they can be used to predict decision outcomes in a meaningful way (e.g. Pajala and Widgrén 2004, Thompson et al. 2006 ).
More formally, let N be a set of n member states in the Council and let S ⊂ N denote any coalition of member states having s members. A voting game in the Council can be characterized by a set function v(S) taking on value 1 when a coalition S forms a qualified majority and zero otherwise. In this simple setting, the Shapley-Shubik index φ i of a member state i can be written
where i = 1, ..., n. The first term in the sum gives the probability of country i being in a pivotal position in coalition S and the latter term counts those pivotal positions where country i is able to swing a winning coalition into losing, i.e. S is winning and the removal of i from it makes it losing. 5 The individual actors' SSI values φ i sum up to unity. 6 Thus, SSI implies that the relative shares of the players' swing positions predict their shares of the total pay-off. In our application the total pay-off constitutes the EU's total budget spending. 7
Evidence
On the basis of the theory outlined above the actual budget shares of the member states should be equal to their corresponding voting power shares measured by SSI. However, looking at past EU budget shares reveals that the SSI values and the realized budget shares do not match one-to-one (see Kauppi and Widgrén (2004, p. 239) ). Does this then indicate that the theory fails to work in practise? We think this is not necessarily the case.
Even if the decisions (obtained through actual voting) of the Council of Ministers would
be perfectly in line with the member states' voting power distribution, their practical implementation is subject to numerous details that are likely to result in deviations from the intended budget allocation, at least in the short run. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the theoretical predictions are accurate only on average. To assess whether such a long-run notion of the theory works we conduct a statistical analysis.
The simplest possible test of the theory can be based on a single regression
where S it denotes country i's budget share in period t and SSI it denotes the Shapley Shubik index of voting power for that country. Here the term u it is a stochastic error that should capture all the short run variation of the budget shares that cannot be explained by the power measure. We will come back to this in more detail below. To this end, notice that should the voting power distribution explain the budget shares all alone, we should have the restrictions β 0 = 0 and β 1 = 1; and, of course, then the error term should surplus left. The symmetry axiom states that the names of the players do not affect the allocation but only their voting rights and, finally the transfer axiom gives the way to combine games. Another classical power index, the Banzhaf index, obeys all these except the efficiency axiom (see Dubey and Shapley 1979 and for an alternative characterization Laruelle and Valenciano 2001) . 7 Here it is important to see that the EU budget (the cake) can be taken as fixed when decisions on its allocation are made in the Council. For a careful explanation see Kauppi and Widgrén (2004, p. 230). have conditional mean zero.
To examine whether these theoretical conditions get any empirical support, we estimate the regression (2) sub-period, and thus changes only four times during the sample period. To remove part of the short run variation in the dependent variable we employ sub-period observations computed as the averages of the annual observations of the years of the above four periods (cf. Kauppi and Widgrén (2004) ).
Pooled OLS estimates of the parameters of (2) are reported in Table 1 (column 1).
Notice that the estimate of the constant term does not deviate significantly from zero, while the parameter estimate of the SSI variable is clearly significant. The 95% confidence interval of the SSI parameter is [.985, 1.25] . This interval includes 1.0, and thus, is in line with our theoretical expectations. Furthermore, an F -test for the joint hypothesis of β 0 = 0 and β 1 = 1 has a p-value 0.21. Thus, these simple statistics imply that the data is consistent with our theoretical predictions. It is rather astonishing that in this single regression the SSI variable is able to explain 87 percent of the variance in budget shares.
At this point it is reasonable to discuss the validity of the above statistical analysis.
Basically, we wish that the above regression results reflect a true causal relationship: voting power measured by SSI essentially determines the EU budget shares in the long run. For this interpretation to be valid, the SSI measure should be exogenous. That is, any other factors (anything in the error term u it ) affecting the budget shares should be independent of the SSI measure. There is no obvious reason why this might not be the case. First of all, notice that the SSI measure derives from abstract game theoretical considerations that are by no means related to the EU decision making or to the ways the Council's decisions are implemented in practise. Nevertheless, it is useful to discuss in more detail what the error term may contain.
There are natural reasons why the error in (2) may be nonzero. As we noted above, the 7 actual decisions of the Council cannot determine precisely how much money is allocated to each country. As a result, the budget shares do not necessarily match with the power shares even if they should. Also, it probably takes relatively long time to correct past deviations from the intended budget shares, while new errors may still enter the process.
Another issue is that the member states do not necessarily immediately see how much power their votes really give to them. It may well take a few years for a new member state to learn to take the full advantage of its voting power. Another type of challenge to the validity of the above regression derives from the view that the EU budget is in fact allocated on the basis of member states' needs rather their power. Namely, the EU declares that its spending aims at promoting equal economic and social progress across the member states. Official publications say, for example, that "by their nature, structural actions should result in differences in expenditure between member states". We believe these types of statements do not match with the reality concerning the decisions of the Council. Why would a minister, a representative of his or her country, care something else but the interests of his or her own country? Still, somebody may be willing to believe or argue that the EU decision making follows, as it declares, high minded principles and solidarity. Thus, one could claim that the above result are due to the fact that the power measure just happens to correlate with the actual needs of the member states. There is no obvious reason why the voting power measures should correlate with the actual needs of the member states. Why would the power shares match with the shares based on the true needs of these countries? If the power measure does not need to match one-to-one with the needs share, why the evidence still supports such one-to-one relationship?
Although many arguments support the assumption that the SSI measure is exogenous, the above regression is still subject to some technical caveats. The key problem is the 8 fact that the values of the dependent variable sum to unity for a given time period. Thus, observations within a sub-period cannot be purely independent. Also, it follows that the errors are non-normal and most likely heteroskedastic. 8 The underlying problems are discussed to some extent in the recent literature on the statistical analysis of fractional response variables (see, e.g., Kieschnik and McCullough, 2003, and Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) . The general message from these studies is that these problems should be handled by formulating a linear model for the logistic transformation of the dependent variable or by applying a non-linear regression. Unfortunately none of the existing models applies directly to our set up here. Nevertheless, under the null hypothesis that the voting power is essentially what matters in the long-run, the linear specification seems to be the most natural choice, despite the fact that the short-run factors in the error term may involve nonlinearities.
The above approach for modeling past budget shares as a function of the SSI measure can be challenged by one more point. The critical question is whether the SSI measure gives accurate enough description of the actual power distribution of the member states.
The SSI assumes that the voters' preferences (probabilities of voting yes) are correlated in the same way regardless of the group of actors. However, in reality some countries may have more similar interests than others in many issues and thus may find it optimal to cooperate on a wide range of issues more closely. If such cooperative groupings of EU member states are important in the real world, the standard SSI may yield an imprecise measure of the true power distribution of the member states. In our previous paper Kauppi and Widgrén (2004) , we considered modified SSI values under the assumption that the EU is divided into two opposite groups of member states. We computed corresponding modified SSI measures for all possible bi-partitions of the EU countries. Interestingly we found that such modified power measures provide significantly better match with the past EU budget shares than the pure SSI provided that France and Germany are on the same side. On the basis of this result it is likely that the pure SSI does not give a perfect measure of the true power distribution of the EU member states.
To see whether the Franco-German partnership suggested by Kauppi and Widgrén (2004) might explain why our initial regression estimates deviate slightly from the theoretical expectations we augmented our regression with a "Franco-German dummy" that equals one for the observations on France and Germany and is zero otherwise. The estimation results are presented in column (2) 
Considered Voting Rules
The Table 2 .
The Constitutional Treaty that was politically agreed in June 2004 resulted in a switch from a weighted voting into a dual majority voting system with additional requirements.
First, a winning coalition must represent at least 55 percent of the EU members and, second, 65 percent of the EU population. Moreover, during the final negotiations two lastminute Summit compromises were inserted: first, at least 15 member states are required to pass a proposal and second, no proposal can be blocked by less than four countries.
Both of these additional rules have a negligible impact on EU-27 decisions. In EU-27, 15 members constitute 55.6 percent of membership meaning that the membership criterion (55 percent) is not binding. After the entry of Turkey and Croatia '15 member states' criterion would not, on the contrary, be binding any longer. Voting rules specified by the Constitutional Treaty are supposed to become into force in November 1, 2009. The rejection of the Constitution by the French and Dutch referenda put, however, the whole constitution in jeopardy and has, at least, made the timetable, if not the ratification, highly uncertain.
In the following, we focus on the Nice and the Constitutional Treaty voting rules, since they are the relevant alternatives in the foreseeable future. As long as the Constitutional Treaty or any other alternative reform fails to pass, the Treaty of Nice rules form the fallback solution. Our analysis below attempts to assess the budget allocation consequences of the eastern enlargement under the two alternative states of the future EU.
Budget Allocation Predictions
In this section, we present budget allocation estimates for the EU by applying the SSI power measure under the two voting rule schemes discussed in the previous section. We present separate estimates for EU-15 and EU-27. Our EU-15 estimates are predictions for the receipts of the incumbent member states prior to the enlargement using the preenlargement voting rules, while the EU-27 estimates are for all the twenty-seven member states after the 2004 enlargement and the entry of Bulgaria and Romania. The latter ones include estimates both under the voting rules of the Nice Treaty (NT) and under those of the Constitutional Treaty (CT). Table 3 reports the respective budget share estimates and Table 4 translates them into actual receipts in 2003 euros.
The results in Table 3 demonstrate that voting rules have large impacts on most member states' budget share predictions. In particular, the budget share estimates of EU-27 under CT deviate rather much from those obtained under NT. In particular, Germany does much better under CT than under NT. CT is also favorable to the other big countries France, Italy and the UK, while the rest of the incumbent countries clearly loose under the CT rules. Most notably, Germany also gains if we compare its budget share in EU-15 under the pre-enlargement rules to the CT rules in EU-27. 13 Among the new member states, only Romania receives more in CT than in NT, while the reverse holds for the remaining new member states. 14 In sum, CT is favorable to big countries except Spain and Poland that gained significantly in Nice compared to the pre-enlargement rules (cf. Baldwin et al. 2001 and Baldwin and Widgrén 2004b) .
In Table 4 , we take 2003 as the reference year, as this was the last complete year of EU-15. The size of the EU budget was about 100 billion euros in 2003. Consequently, our estimates for the receipts of the EU-15 countries prior to eastern enlargement are obtained by multiplying this figure by the budget share estimates given in Table 3 . We estimate that the EU-budget will be 4.5% larger in EU-27, corresponding the percentage increase in EU wide GDP due to the new countries. Therefore, a comparable "as if" estimate for the EU-27 budget is 104.5 billion euros. The estimates of the receipts of the EU-27 countries are computed by applying the corresponding budget share estimates.
According to the figures in Table 4 13 This is reminiscent to the paradox of new members. Note, however, that here we have two changes: the enlargement and the voting rule reform. Germany's gain is primarily due to the latter.
14 Note, however, that in EU-25 also the smallest member states gain (see Kauppi and Widgrén 2005) . 15 The paper does not consider Malta and Cyprus. Their total impact is, however, relatively small. in Baldwin et al. (1997) , is well in line with our estimate using the CT rules. This is because the CT rules made the incumbent countries as an aggregate more powerful than they would have been under the pre-Nice or temporary rules in the Accession Treaties.
13
Given that power politics dictate the determination of budget shares, this suggests that the budget cost of the enlargement should be lower under the CT rules than under preNice rules. 18 If we compare our estimate under the NT rules to Baldwin et al. (1997) estimates they are practically the same.
19
Let us next investigate the distribution of losses among EU-15 countries. The point of comparison here is the pre-Nice distribution of power in the Council of EU-15. Table   5 demonstrates that the distribution of losses differ substantially regarding the applied rules. Under the NT rules, the biggest countries loose more in absolute terms than the smallest countries whereas under the CT rules the reverse holds. In per capita terms, the smallest member states loose, however, more than the big countries in both scenarios.
Under CT, the losses of the biggest countries are at the magnitude between 40 and 60 euros per head per year, whereas they are at the magnitude of hundreds of euros per head for the smallest countries. The most striking observation in Table 5 is Germany's absolute gain under the CT rules. Under the CT rules Germany obtains 5.3 billion euros more than under the pre-Nice rules before the enlargement. That is over 40 percent of Germany's net contribution to the EU budget. 16 In Baldwin et al. (1997) an interpolation of pre-Nice numbers of votes were used (for details see Widgrén 1994 or Baldwin 1994 . They were based on estimated logarithmic function. In the Accession Treaty interpolation Estonia and Slovakia are the only countries in EU-25 that get one vote less than the mathematical formula suggests whereas the other countries are fitting perfectly.
17 Cyprus and Malta are excluded in Baldwin et al. (1997) . Their impact is, however, relatively small (1.6-2.0 billion euros depending on the voting rule).
18 In EU-25 the aggregate share of incumbents' power would have been 70.7 percent under the temporary rules. Under NT rules the corresponding share is 73.2 and under CT rules 76.8 percent. The temporary rules are not defined for EU-27 as at the time of Bulgaria's and Romania's entry the Nice rules shall apply.
19 Results on Temporary Accession Treaty rules are not reported here in detail. They can be obtained from the authors upon request. The results differ surprisingly little from the NT rules.
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Conclusion
This paper has estimated the impacts of different voting rules on the allocation of EU budget expenditure before and after eastern enlargement. Our analysis was based on the view that the budget allocation is completely determined by member states' voting power in the Council of Ministers. We provided predictions for the EU budget under two voting rule schemes, one under the Nice Treaty and the other under the Constitutional Treaty.
The results indicate that eastern enlargement to the EU27 has large effects on the budget receipts of the incumbent member states. The incumbent member states are predicted to loose 27.6 billion euros under the Nice Treaty and 21.8 billion euros under the Constitutional Treaty when EU membership is expanded from 15 to 27 countries.
Thus, according to our estimates the cost of the enlargement would roughly be six billion euros smaller under the Constitutional Treaty than under the Nice Treaty voting rules.
In both absolute and relative terms, small countries loose more under the Constitutional Treaty than the biggest countries, whereas under the Nice Treaty only relative losses decrease in country size. Germany is the biggest winner under the Constitutional Treaty.
The key explanation is that population counts more on power under the Constitutional 
